A blockchain as a trustworthy and secure decentralized and distributed network has been emerged for many applications such as in banking, finance, insurance, healthcare and business. Recently, many communities in blockchain networks want to deploy machine learning models to get meaningful knowledge from geographically distributed large-scale data owned by each participant. To run a learning model without data centralization, distributed machine learning (DML) for blockchain networks has been studied. While several works have been proposed, privacy and security have not been sufficiently addressed, and as we show later, there are vulnerabilities in the architecture and limitations in terms of efficiency. In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving DML model for a permissioned blockchain to resolve the privacy, security, and performance issues in a systematic way. We develop a differentially private stochastic gradient descent method and an error-based aggregation rule as core primitives. Our model can treat any type of differentially private learning algorithm where non-deterministic functions should be defined. The proposed error-based aggregation rule is effective to prevent attacks by an adversarial node that tries to deteriorate the accuracy of DML models. Our experiment results show that our proposed model provides stronger resilience against adversarial attacks than other aggregation rules under a differentially private scenario. Finally, we show that our proposed model has high usability because it has low computational complexity and low transaction latency.
I. INTRODUCTION
A blockchain is defined as a trustworthy and secure decentralized and distributed network that provides interactions among participants such as communities that consist of individuals, companies or governments that have a specific or common goals, e.g., cryptocurrencies, sharing medical information in healthcare or exchanging goods in a business environment [1] , [2] . Each participant in the blockchain has a shared ledger (i.e., ledger which consists of a series of transactions) with others to guarantee immutability and consistency for every transaction, with each transaction verified for validity by a consensus of a majority of nodes. If a transaction has been proved, some participant makes a block that consists of a The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Yi Qian. set of transactions, and then updates it to the last block in the shared ledger. These blocks are connected by a hash value in the ledger, and the transactions cannot be altered by construction with its hash chain [3] , [4] .
Recently, many communities in blockchain networks want to deploy machine learning models to get computational statistics or data analyses results. For example, a medical researcher who wants to provide patient-specific treatment can train a predictive model of disease by collaborating with secure medical communities in a blockchain network without any additional process of negotiating with each other for a database [5] . However, it is often hard to collect large-scale and massive amounts of geographically distributed data in a single data storage because of usability, privacy issues, security enhancement, polices, and regulations, such as GDRP [6] .
To run a learning model without data centralization, VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ a distributed machine learning (DML) model for blockchain networks should be built based on multiple entities, i.e., a computing node and multiple workers for parallel processing. This means that the computing node computes global weight from collecting only learning results from each worker as a participant in each round. A DML can provide effective ways of using data inherently distributed across multiple domains without a central data server [7] - [12] .
To make a reliable DML model for a blockchain network, privacy and security aspects should be considered appropriately by design. First of all, the DML model has to prevent privacy leakage from data by a learning process. Usually, databases include sensitive information about individuals, e.g., diseases in medical records. As shown in Reference [13] , even though the result from a learning process has only summary information, partial sensitive information can be still derived. One promising privacy-preserving approach that protects privacy leakage is differential privacy (DP) [14] , [15] , which is based on adding noise by a randomized mechanism.
In addition, on the system security side, computation in a distributed network with multi-party entities sometimes incurs system failure by computational error. This is caused by unreliable workers alone or in collusion together, which acts as malicious behavior. The goal of such a collusion attack is to deteriorate the accuracy of the DML model by returning the wrong local gradient by attackers. These kinds of attacks have been considered and formulated in [16] , and an aggregation rule to prevent collusion attacks has been studied to prevent similar attacks by [16] - [19] .
There have been several studies on dealing with a combination of machine learning and blockchain, but they did not guarantee privacy and had security problems as well. References [10] and [12] proposed a machine learning model for a permissionless blockchain. A permissionless blockchain aims to be a fully decentralized scalable network in any situation and/or any environment. However, they did not address privacy, security and efficiency issues sufficiently well, and have vulnerabilities in their proposed algorithm or limitations in their structure as follows.
• Privacy leakage by learning algorithm: the proposed algorithms in [10] and [12] , respectively, cannot guarantee privacy-preserving properties correctly. Basically, differentially private machine learning has to consider how we apply differentially private algorithms to machine learning and how many times we can train without any breach of privacy. However, they do not present the basic requirements for DP.
• Security threats by system architecture: The blockchain systems that they have used cannot support the computation of non-deterministic functions, e.g., a randomized mechanism by DP. These systems can only support deterministic functions. Also, the proposed aggregation rules in [12] and [10] had low collusion resistance ability or did not address any collusion attacks, respectively.
• Model efficiency for real-world systems: it seems hard for the algorithms to have reasonably good computational efficiency when they do learning consensus. This is because their blockchain system was built by a consensus process based on Proof of Work (PoW), which takes about 10 minutes for each learning round. Even though learning on very large databases sometimes takes much more time than 10 minutes, such time spent must not be ignored for data on various scales or that require quick processing in real-world systems. In this paper, we explore and propose a privacy-preserving DML model for a permissioned blockchain network to resolve such important issues, which are described as above. Permissioned blockchains have been deployed in many realworld systems such as banking, finance, insurance, healthcare and business. This means, as we have shown with the explanation in secure medical communities, that machine learning fits better in a permissioned blockchain than restrictive applications in a permissionless blockchain (e.g., cryptocurrencies). Also, it can provide reasonably good system efficiency compared with other permissionless blockchains. In particular, the consensus process in a permissioned blockchain has more reasonable computational time than a PoW-based one, e.g., within a minute. To the best of our knowledge, our proposal is the first privacy-preserving DML model for a permissioned blockchain.
The reliable construction of a privacy-preserving DML model for a permissioned blockchain is not simple. It cannot be constructed by modifying previous models on a permissionless blockchain with a permissioned one, because these kinds of blockchains have totally different underlying architectures. To systematically guarantee privacy, security and efficiency, we built a framework with the differentially private algorithms and core components we devised. There are two main components for shifting the paradigm to a permissioned blockchain, which are described as follows.
First, one of our design goals is to treat any differentially private learning algorithm without any system problem by this construction. This seems impossible with a permissionless blockchain [10] , [12] because non-deterministic functions cannot be realized. Instead, we made it possible using a permissioned blockchain, for example, Hyperledger Fabric [2] , [20] with simulate-order-execute architecture.
Second, as an essential primitive of our model, we present a novel error-based aggregation rule on differentially private stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [21] based on the simulateorder-execute architecture. As shown in our experimental results, the proposed error-based aggregation rule has fairly high resilience, especially in differentially private scenarios, against various collusion attacks by adversarial nodes that try to deteriorate model accuracy.
Our proposed model has three phases: simulation, ordering, and execution [2] . In the simulation phase, each participant in the network simulates and computes each local gradient under the current global weight on their own local datasets. Then the participants broadcast the local gradients to the authority node, which makes a block at each learning round. The authority node reaches a consensus to make a block, which consists of a computed global weight with a gradient that is aggregated by our proposed error-based rule in the ordering phase. Finally, in the execution phase, all participants in the network commit a block that is broadcast by the authority node.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We first propose a privacy-preserving DML model for a permissioned blockchain with DP. Our model can treat any differentially private SGD.
• To prevent any attacks by adversarial nodes in the aggregation process for model security, a secure, accurate and efficient method is proposed based on a new error-based aggregation rule.
• We consider two collusion attacks in our experiment. In particular, we present ''low distance attacks,'' which can be viewed as more elaborated collusion attacks to deteriorate model accuracy. As a result, our error-based aggregation rule has high resilience to attack scenarios in our experiments.
• Our experiment results show that our model has low computational complexity and low transaction latency compared to other blockchain-based DML models. Our paper is organized as follows. Section II explains blockchain and differential privacy. Section III introduces related works. Section IV describes the problem statement. Section V describes for our proposed model. Section VI analyzes the privacy and security of our proposed model, and Section VII describes our experimental evaluation. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we describe the background knowledge for our proposed model, that is, the architecture and overview for blockchain using Hyperledger Fabric [2] , [20] and DP.
A. ARCHITECTURE AND OVERVIEW FOR BLOCKCHAIN USING HYPERLEDGER FABRIC
The technical area for blockchain is divided into permissionless and permissioned blockchain networks by restricting participation. Typically, permissionless blockchain aims to be a fully decentralized scalable network in any situation and/or any environment. Therefore, anyone can participate and execute transactions in the network. Also, to make a block without any forging, they use a consensus process that use computing power such as PoW or stakes for some assets such as PoS (Proof of Stake), which are used by Bitcoin [22] and Ethereum [23] , respectively. Most permissionless blockchain have deployed in native cryptocurrencies.
A permissioned blockchain, on the other hand, provides a way to secure interactions among a group of entities that have a common goal but do not fully trust each other, such as a community for banking, finance, insurance, healthcare and businesses that exchange information, funds or goods [1] , [2] .
Participants who have an approved identity (e.g., X.509 certificate) can join in a permissioned blockchain by a network organization. By relying on these conditions, the permissioned blockchain can use practical Byzantine-fault tolerant (PBFT) consensus [24] , Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET) [25], etc. Also, the permissioned blockchain has more usability and efficiency than permissionless blockchain for real-world systems which need computational statistics or data analyses than permissionless blockchain. For this reason, for more practicality in real-world systems, we have to build a DML model on a permissioned blockchain.
On the other hand, many existing smart contract-based blockchains, including both permissionless and permissioned blockchains, follow the order-execute architecture, which is based on active replication [26] , [27] . This means that, each transaction is validated and executed sequentially after making a block that consists of an ordered set of transactions. Therefore, in order-execute architecture, all smart contract functions that treat transactions must be deterministic because every transaction is executed after a consensus process. As a result, this architecture has an influence on the establishment of non-deterministic functions such as randomized functions in the privacy-preserving data analysis process, e.g., randomized process by DP.
To solve these non-deterministic issues in previous orderexecute-based blockchain systems, simulate-order-execute architecture, which is based on both active replication and passive replication [28] , [26] has been proposed by Hyperledger Fabric [2] , simply called Fabric, which is one of the most popular permissioned blockchain systems. Fabric adds an additional validation process, called simulation, which validates all transactions in the current local state ledger for specific peers, who are called endorsing peers in Fabric, before the ordering phase. Fig. 1 illustrates the transaction flow on Fabric, which is based on three-phase simulate-order-execute architecture. First, a client executes a chaincode for a transaction proposal. The client, which is called a client application, is an entity for chaincode execution in the Fabric network. The chaincode, FIGURE 1. Transaction flow in Hyperledger Fabric [2] . VOLUME 7, 2019 which is typically called a smart contract, is a set of functions for programmable transaction logics. These functions run on trusted distributed application, and must be deployed before executing transactions. Their functions consist of a set of queries for a transaction such as loading, saving and executing, etc.
At first, a participant can use the client application at any time when they want a transaction. Then, the client sends a transaction proposal to one or more endorsers for execution. Endorsers in the network could be composed of any peer by an endorsement policy. We describe this architecture minutely step by step which are notated in Fig. 1 as follows:
Step : Each endorser simulates a proposal against the local ledger of endorser without synchronization with other participants. The result of simulation is not applied to the ledger state. Then each endorser returns an endorsement that contains a version value for transaction sequence checking in the future execution phase and issues a pass or fail stamp for the transaction proposal.
Step : The client collects endorsements until they satisfy an endorsement policy that is decided by the network organization, e.g., the transaction proposal has to get a pass stamps by chaincode with m2i + 2 endorsers, and valid signatures by any 2i + 1 out of the m endorsers.
Step : Before the ordering phase, the client broadcasts the transaction proposal with endorsements to the ordering service(OS) which is comprised of multiple ordering service nodes, or simply, orderers [2] . The OS collects multiple transactions within a few seconds. Then, it establishes a total order for all submitted transactions per channel by a consensus process in the ordering phase. The output is a block that comprises multiple transactions with endorsements for each transaction.
Step : After making a block, the OS broadcasts the block with all transaction endorsements to all participants.
Step : In the execution phase, each participant validates endorsements for each transaction in the block. There are two steps for validation. First, each participant validate endorsements by the endorsement policy as described above. Then they each validate a version conflict check for a transaction sequence in the block. Otherwise, some double-spending problem for specific transactions could be occurred within a block. However, in this paper, we only consider the model with gradients as a kind of transaction that does not need any sequence in the block, because we assume that the gradients are synchronized in each round. So, we only consider the validation for endorsements.
Step Commit: Finally, only approved transactions in the block can be executed and updated to the current ledger state. 1 Fig.2 illustrates the architecture of Fabric at a high level. At first, each participant (called a peer by Fabric) is granted an identity that has been approved by a Fabric Certificate 1 Actually, Fabric updates both valid transactions and invalid transactions to each ledger. In Fabric, a Validated ledger contains only valid and committed transactions and a PeerLedger contains both valid and invalid transactions. Only the Validated ledger is effective in real transaction execution. Authority (CA). Then, each participant has a shared ledger and private data (in blue stripes) as illustrated in Fig. 2 . Anyone who is in the Fabric network can access the shared ledger. On the other hand, only some participants can access private data by Fabric channels. The channels allow a specific set of participants and applications to communicate with each other within a blockchain network. That is, only members on a channel can access their private data [20] . In this example, in Fig. 2 , participant A and participant B comprise channel 1, and participants B, C, and D comprise channel 2. So, participant A cannot see private data 2 for channel 2, and participant C and D cannot access private data 1 for channel 1. Only participant B can access both private data. Therefore, chaincode includes not only a set of queries for a shared ledger, but also a set of queries for private data. Finally, the OS makes a block that comprises multiple transactions for each few seconds.
B. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Currently, DP is a popular method for preserving data privacy and is formulated by a rigorous mathematical proof. For any given neighboring databases D, D that differ in a single data point, a randomized mechanism M is said to be differentially private if two outputs, M(D) and M D , are close to each other. This means that no adversary can distinguish between these neighboring databases by having two outputs even if he or she had prior knowledge of a specific individual in the dataset.
(Definition Differential Privacy): A randomized mechanism M satisfies ( , δ) −differential privacy if for any two neighboring databases D, D ∈ D and for any subset of outputs S ⊆ R where R is the output space of M, it holds that:
This means that the ratio of probability distributions for two output spaces is bounded by e with probability of at least 1 − δ.
The additive term δ should usually be 0 or a positive value δ ≤ 10 −4 , and (when δ = 0,) a randomized mechanism M satisfies −DP when it holds that Pr [M (d) ∈ S] ≤ e · Pr M d ∈ S . In particular, in this paper, we apply a Gaussian mechanism [15] to SGD, which is defined by [21] .
where ||·|| 2 is the l 2 -norm and D, D are neighboring databases. The Gaussian mechanism in [21] is defined by:
where N (0, ( f σ ) 2 ) is the Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation f σ . Then, the Gaussian mecha-
The important property of DP is a composition for a repeated additive-noise mechanism. This means that if each iteration of the privacy-preserving mechanism guarantees DP, the total privacy-preserving mechanism also guarantees DP by composition theorem. A simple composition shows that the composition of k queries, each of which guarantees ( , δ)-DP has at least (k , kδ)differentially private [14] , [29] - [32] . This means that the privacy for a total mechanism is deteriorated by k times under k-fold composition. A tighter bound under k-fold composition, which is called a strong composition, shows that the total mechanism guarantees , kδ + δ -DP where = O k · log (1 δ) [31] . However, a tighter bound under k-fold composition is needed when we do a learning process because k is very large, e.g., k ≥ 500. Here, in the same manner, we follow the moments accountant method [21] , [29] , which is used on the SGD. We will describe the moments accountant in section V after describing DML on SGD.
III. RELATED WORK
In this section, we describe related work. First, we review privacy-preserving approaches on blockchain. Next, we review differentially private SGD for data privacy and collusion attacks for aggregation for system security.
A. PRIVACY-PRESERVING MODELS ON BLOCKCHAIN
There are many challenges for privacy-preserving models on blockchain. In references [3] , [33] and [34] , authors employ secure multiparty computation (secure-MPC) on blockchain systems. In [33] and [34] , they use secure-MPC protocols for supporting private data on permissioned blockchain architecture. In particular, in [3] , they deploy a privacy-preserving architecture by secure-MPC on Fabric. This work could be useful for applications that need exact computation (e.g., bidding or voting) rather than knowledge discovery from data from learning.
The authors in references in [35] - [37] employ zero knowledge proofs (ZKP). However, these frameworks aim at confidential transactions rather than knowledge discovery from data. So, no one has tried to conduct any learning process for computational statistics on blockchain systems.
On the other hand, to conduct privacy-preserving data analysis on the blockchain, two techniques have proposed DML model to the permissionless blockchain. First, reference [10] proposes exchange-based learning. This means that some local weight with lowest error for each participant in each iteration becomes the next global weight. Such an exchange is based on their proposed consensus algorithm, which is based on PoW. However, they only assume that their network is enclosed from the outside, even if they use the characteristic of permissionless blockchain. Also, they do not consider data privacy, and their consensus is not efficient, because such PoW-based consensus takes long time (10 minutes on average) for each learning iteration.
Unlike [10] , reference [12] computes a global weight by aggregation-based learning, which is computed by aggregating multiple local gradients from each participant in each iteration. They also design a privacy-preserving gradient computation that is based on DP. However, because their algorithm is based on PoW, it takes a long time for each iteration. In addition, they do not have high resilience in various attack scenarios by our experiments. We will describe these experimental result in Section VII.
B. STOCHASTIC GRADIENT DESCENT WITH DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
There are many privacy-preserving algorithms for stochastic gradient descent (SGD). In terms of DP, there are many applications in differentially private SGD algorithms. Reference [38] proposes distributed SGD, called DSSGD (Distributed Selective SGD) using differentially private sparse vector technique (SVT) [39] to reduce network bandwidth. However, DSSGD assumed that all nodes are fully honest parties. It also requires relatively high computational cost because [38] uses Laplace noise in two or three times at each round. Moreover, their algorithm has high privacy loss per participant because they only use strong composition [31] for a repeated additive-noise mechanism. On the contrary, reference [21] is the cornerstone work for differentially private SGD algorithms. They employ DP with Gaussian noise, which guarantees ( , δ)-DP at each epoch. And their composition is proved by moments accountant, which keeps track of a bound on the moments of the privacy loss random variable. Our algorithm is based on [21] , which means that we use Gaussian noise and compute compositions using their moments accountant.
Also, [12] uses Laplace noise, which guarantees -DP [9] . However, [12] does not consider composition for a repeated additive-noise mechanism. That is, [12] does not guarantee privacy conditions for DP.
C. COLLUSION ATTACKS FOR GRADIENTS AGGREGATION IN DML
As discussed in the introduction, the DML model has to consider collusion attacks from adversarial nodes for system VOLUME 7, 2019 security. There are several aggregation rules for tolerant collusion attacks [12] , [16] - [19] . First, reference [16] formulate the attack scenario when f attackers who can try to attack alone or in collusion together try to deteriorate the accuracy of the DML algorithms. Also, they propose multi-Krum, which is resilient to f attackers by assuming 2f + 2 < K , where K is the total number of participants. Later works [17] - [19] propose aggregation rules that guarantee resilience for f attackers on various assumptions. Also, in [12] , they propose a l− nearest aggregation rule that has low computational overhead other than aggregation rules on a permissionless blockchain network.
However, both multi-Krum and l− nearest aggregation rule do not have high resilience in various attack scenarios by our experiments. We will describe these experimental result in Section VII.
IV. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we formulate the problem of DML on blockchain. First, we describe our notation, which is based on the formulation for the basic problem of DML. Then, we introduce a security and privacy threat model for the problem of DML on a permissioned blockchain.
A. OUR NOTATION
We assume that training dataset D = {(x 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (x N , y N )} is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) among K participants. Each participant k ∈ [K ] has an ID (identity), which is expressed by a set of IDs for the number of K participants {id k } k∈ [K ] . Then, each id k locally possesses D k with N k samples, which is a subset of D. And we assume that D k ∩ D l = 0 for all k = l, which means that any two local datasets are disjointed, i.e., D = {D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D K }.
The goal is to learn an aggregated global weight by minimizing the empirical loss function that is divided into N sums locally as:
In the t th learning round (iteration), we can compute the local gradient by:
Finally, we compute (t + 1)th global weight by aggregated t-th local gradients by:
where ∇L (θ t ) = 1 N K k=1 ∇L k (θ t ) + λθ t with a regularization parameter λ.
For complex networks, the loss function L is usually nonconvex and difficult to minimize. This problem can be solved in practice by mini-batch SGD. Mini-batch SGD splits the dataset into small batches and estimates the gradient by computing the gradient of the loss for a group of examples and taking the average. This average provides an unbiased estimator, the variance of which decreases quickly with the size of the group [21] . Our notation, which is described as follows will be used in section IV for local mini-batch SGD.
Each participant has a common epoch E and a batch b ∈ B with batch size B. Epoch means one pass each of the full local dataset. In an epoch, the local dataset is divided into N k /B batches. Then, the sampling probability for each data row is q = B/N k . The total learning round T is (N k B) · E.
B. THREAT MODEL
Our goal is to build a privacy-preserving DML on a permissioned blockchain. There are two kinds of threats: data privacy and system security.
1) DATA PRIVACY
Recalling reference [12] , most databases owned by a participant include individual and sensitive information, e.g., diseases in medical records. Adversaries who are outside the network try to get the sensitive information by eavesdropping on broadcast messages. Furthermore, an inside attack by malicious participants could occur because some, but not all, participants share their data privately, e.g., in channels in Fabric [2] , and each participant would not share all their data.
2) SYSTEM SECURITY
There are many systematic issues for security with distributed systems. In our work, we only focus on consistency for the system and an attack by adversarial nodes for the aggregation process because we only apply a trustworthy permissioned blockchain network [2] , [40] , [41] . System consistency in DML systems could be threatened by the attacks or system malfunction as follows.
a: WRONG COMPUTATION RESULTS FROM ADVERSARIAL NODES
Recall [16] , [12] , where the number of f adversaries who can try to attack alone or in collusion together could return a wrong value and not the original computation result to deteriorate the accuracy of the DML algorithms by assuming 2f + 2 < K on the total number of K participants in the network. Such attacks have to be prevented by secure aggregation rules or/and secure architecture system perspectives.
b: WRONG COMPUTATION RESULTS FROM SYSTEM MALFUNCTION
Additionally, on the system malfunction side, an incorrect result can sometimes be computed without any other attacks. For example, when we run a differentially private DML to predict color preferences for goods, a color with a low preference could be in the top 5 colors if the system cannot compute non-deterministic functions correctly.
V. OUR PROPOSED MODEL
In this section, we design and build a privacy-preserving DML model on a permissioned blockchain. See the overview of our proposed model in Fig. 3 . For simplification of description of our model, we skip a network establishment process in the initial step because we only consider the DML process on the blockchain network, not how the network has been composed.
It is assumed that peers as participants who have approved identities (e.g., X.509 certificate) can join in the permissioned network by a network organization. As shown in Fig. 3 , all participants in the network have a shared ledger and their local database. Also, any participant can be an endorsing peer in the network with an endorsement policy.
Our model consists of the following three processes, which fits well in the simulate-order-execute-based permissioned blockchain such as [2] as it is:
Simulation Phase: All participants compute a local gradient locally. Then, the number of m endorsing peers, which is a semi-trusted party, simulates a local gradient by each locally. The simulation results are presented as a set of endorsements, which has the error rate for each local gradient. Then, the client application collects endorsements for all K local gradients. Finally, the collected endorsements are broadcast to the OS from the client application. We will describe the simulation phase with differentially private scenario.
Ordering Phase: After receiving the collected endorsements, the OS, which is a trusted party, computes a global weight by our proposed error-based aggregation rule. 2 We show that the error-based aggregation rule is more accurate than the previous aggregation rule and has low computational overhead by experiments later. Intuitively, this means a rule by which a certain number of nearest learning results can be aggregated using low errors saved to the immutable ledger as a log. See more details in Subsection B. Next, the OS makes 2 The OS is comprised of multiple orderers which is described as in Section II. We skip the connection between multiple orderers, because it is also a network establishment process in the initial step. a block that is composed of the global weight for the current round with simulation results. Finally, the OS broadcasts the block to all participants.
Execution Phase: Each participant updates the current block to the shared ledger that is viewed by all participants. Typically, the original transaction has double-spending problem in the block if it was not checked a sequence correctly after making a block. However, we can skip this process because the gradients in the learning process have no sequence with each other under synchronous environments. Also, we provide an error-based auditing process at any time to any participant who wants to audit. Previous work [10] , [12] does not provide any auditing systems for gradient computations. We will describe our error-based system in Subsection C.
A. SIMULATION PHASE
Algorithm 1 illustrates the simulation phase. In this phase, all participants who have local dataset D k compute the local gradient in parallel by the Local Gradient Computation step. Note that the actual computation for this step is run by the client application. First, in this step, each participant splits D k into batches of size B to run differentially private SGD with each other (line 3). By following Eq. (3), in iteration step t, each computes a local gradient with norm clipping (lines 5-6). Norm clipping ensures that if ||∇L k (θ t ; b) || 2 ≤ C, then ∇L k (θ t ; b) is preserved; otherwise, it gets scaled down by clipping threshold C. This gradient clipping is a popular method of SGD for deep networks for gradient explosion. Then, by following Eqs. (1) and (4), each computes the final local weight θ k t+1 , adding noise by Gaussian mechanism under sensitivity C [15] , [21] (lines 7-8). In next step,
Algorithm 1 Simulation Phase
Local Gradient Computation:
for iteration t do 5:
(e k t+1 ; id k ) ← Median(Endorsing θ k t+1 ) 10:
return endorsement = {∇ L k , ||∇ L k ||, e k t+1 ; id k } to OS Endorsing (by endorsing peer): 11 : for each endorsing peer in parallel do 12: compute err(θ k t+1 ) on their dataset 13:
return err(θ k t+1 ) to client we compute the errors for each local gradient {θ k t+1 } K k=1 in the Endorsing step. Endorsing peers in parallel simulate each local gradient θ k t+1 on their dataset and compute err(θ k t+1 ) by simulation result for θ k t+1 (line 12). The result with id k is represented as e k t+1 by median value for all results for every endorsing peer (line 9). Finally, the client application returns the endorsement, which is composed of the error and the local gradient (line 10). Due to space constraints, we simply note ∇ L k for ∇ L k (θ t ) in our algorithms. The OS collects ∇ L k (θ t ) instead of θ k t+1 because it aggregates local gradients and computes global weight computes for global gradient by aggregation process.
B. ORDERING PHASE AND EXECUTION PHASE
Algorithm 2 illustrates the ordering and execution phase. In the ordering phase, the OS computes a global gradient with the Global Gradient Computation step. As discussed in the threat model, sometimes wrong computation results for local gradients could be caused by adversarial attackers or system malfunction. Therefore, the original aggregation rules aim at a majority-based approach, which is based on major K − f local gradients where K is the number of local gradients and f is the number of incorrect local gradients by malicious attacks or systematic issues. First, the OS selects and aggregates only the number of l(f < l < K ) local gradients from total K local gradients by an aggregation rule (line 2) that is described in next paragraph. Then, by following Eq. (4), the global gradient θ t+1 is computed by the sum of #l local gradients (line 3). Also, the error value e k t+1 for participant k in L is replaced as null. This means that the error for participant k is not written if his or her local gradient was included in L(line 5). Finally, the global gradient θ t+1 with M k = {e k t+1 ; id k }, which is represented as a block Block t+1 and will be written to the ledger in step t is broadcast to all participant (lines 6-7). Last, in the execution phase, all participants easily update Block t+1 to the global ledger (line 9) in the commitment step.
Algorithm 2 Ordering and Execution phase Global Gradients Computation (by OS in Ordering phase):
broadcast Block t+1 to all participant Commitment ( by all participants in the Execution phase): 8: for each participant k = 1, 2, . . . , K in parallel do 9: update Block t+1 to the global ledger for (t + 1)th model
C. THE DESCRIPTION FOR OUR ERROR-BASED SYSTEM
As a result of the execution phase, we can share not only global weight, but also the errors from each local gradient. Our error logging method can provide two aspects, which are described as follows.
First, as an essential primitive of our model, we can provide an efficient aggregation rule for global weight by our errorbased system, which is called error-based aggregation rule. Algorithm 3 illustrates our proposed error-based aggregation rule. We can aggregate local gradients by the lowest l errors, which is totally different from the original majority-based approaches to the aggregation rules (line 1). This means that our proposed aggregation rule needs only current state endorsements, which are returned by the simulation phase without any additional computation. Also, to prevent the gradient scale from becoming too large, we throw away some local gradients that have a large scale for each local gradient vector by median for l 1 − norm with constant parameter α (lines 2-4). 
Algorithm 3 Our Error-Based Aggregation Rule
As a result, different from [12] and [16] , our error-based aggregation rule has low time complexity, which can be computed by O(K · logK ) with the best case in a sorting algorithm to find the median value where K is the total number of participants in the DML process. However, there are O(K 2 ·d) in [16] and O(K · d) in [12] , respectively, where d is the dimension of each vector. Also, in terms of computation times on the implementation side to make a block, e.g., if we have K = 20, our model with the error-based aggregation rule can be done within a minute, which is a very short time compared to other blockchain-based DML systems [10] , [12] . We will discuss more about this issue in section VII.
Second, we can provide the error-based auditing process at any time in real time. Previous works [10] , [12] do not provide any auditing systems for gradient computations. However, our proposed error-based auditing system can provide extensible management for malicious or suspicious participants. In particular, the error-based auditing is valid for a permissioned blockchain because it can provide an ID-based tracking system in the permissioned systems because such permissioned blockchains are typically based on identity management systems. Fig. 4 illustrates how the error-based auditing works. The OS broadcasts a block to all participants in a network organization. Then, the network organization updates all error rates to an error list for each participant in the network. In this situation, for example, if t i=1 e k i ≥ τ where τ is a threshold controlled by the network policy, e.g., 0.6t, the network organization adds to the greylist and sends a warning message to suspicious members who have a higher error rate than τ .
VI. PRIVACY AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the privacy and security of our proposed model.
A. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In our proposed model, we assume that all participants have an approved identity that is managed and issued by the identity management system in a permissioned network. Therefore, the identity privacy in our framework is out of the scope of our work. We only consider privacy leakage from data when a learning process is running.
As described above, our proposed algorithm in the Local Gradient Computation step in algorithm 1 satisfies ( , δ) −DP by [21] , for a full local dataset under sensitivity C, which is decided by norm clipping. Therefore, our algorithm provides (q , qδ) −DP for each iteration where q = B/N k . Without any advanced composition techniques, the total mechanism after the T learning round is (Tq , Tqδ) −DP, which is very inefficient because T is typically very large, e.g., T ≥ 500. Therefore, we follow moments accountant [21] , which has the smallest bound in differentially private SGD, as follows.
Theorem 1 (Moments Accountant [21] ): Our proposed algorithm in the Local Gradient Computation step in algorithm 1 satisfies ( , δ) −differential privacy where the number of iteration T , the sampling probability q = B/N k , and for any < c 1 q 2 T , δ > 0 if we choose:
for σ ≥ 1 under some constants c 1 and c 2 with q < 1 16σ . As a result, our Local Gradient Computation provides O q √ T , δ −DP under iteration T with sampling probability q = B/N k with the moments accountant method [21] , which is a significantly lower bound than the strong composition [31] has O q √ T · log(1/δ) , qT δ −DP.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In our work, we only focus on consistency for the system and attacks by adversarial nodes for the aggregation process because we only apply a trustworthy permissioned blockchain network [2] , [40] , [41] . Also, we assume that the number of m endorsing peers is a semi-trusted party and the OS is a trusted party, as described above. Based on these conditions, we focus on two security problems in the learning system. Recall [16] , in an attack scenario, where the number of f adversaries who can try to attack alone or in collusion together could return a wrong value and not the original computation result to deteriorate the accuracy of the DML algorithms by assuming 2f + 2 < K in the total number of K participants in the network. We have to consider these problems in the simulation phase and ordering phase in our model. Additionally, we consider the situation where the system is malfunctioning by a specific operation in our learning framework.
In the Endorsing step in algorithm 1, some endorsing peers alone or in collusion together could return a wrong result that is not in the original computation results by learning on their local dataset. However, in line 9 of algorithm 1, we collect errors in endorsements by median, which is used for robust measures. This median-based error logging method can provide resilience for the number of f attacks by assuming 2f + 2 < m with the number of m endorsing peers in the Endorsing step with an endorsement policy, as described in section II. For example, malicious attackers in endorsing peers could try to return a high error value, e.g., err θ k t+1 = 1. Such an outlier can lead to an incorrect endorsing result if we collect errors by mean. However, our median-based error logging method can guarantee any f ≤ m/2 − 1 out of the m endorsers.
In the Global Gradient Computation step in algorithm 2, some participants alone or in collusion together could return a wrong local vector to deteriorate the accuracy of the DML algorithms. However, in line 2 of algorithm 2, we can provide existing secure aggregation rules [16] - [19] that are resilient to f attackers alone or in collusion. Additionally, we offer a simple and efficient approach using error-based systems, as described in section V, by aggregating local gradients with the lowest l errors without any additional processes. Our error-based aggregation rule can also be collusion-resilient to any f ≤ K /2 − 1 attackers because we use the lowest l errors and throw away large-scale vectors after selecting local gradients by median. In addition, our error-based system can support ID tracking systems based on error-based auditing at any time for every participant. This method is suitable for applications based on a permissioned blockchain in which each participant has an identity. As a result, our error-based system has pre-and post-detection and auditing ability for steady malicious participants using a list of some members who have a high error rate. Such a greylist can be managed by the network organization with the network policy in the permissioned blockchain network.
Furthermore, on the system malfunction side, an incorrect result can sometimes be computed without any other attacks, as discussed in section IV. Most blockchain-based services cannot compute non-deterministic functions correctly because they are based on order-execute architecture, which follows active replication [26] , [27] , as discussed in section I. However, the applications in our proposed model with simulate-order-execute architecture can compute any non-deterministic functions in any system environment correctly. Such characteristics are important when we use a differentially private algorithm; otherwise, it usually returns an incorrect learning result, e.g., incorrect estimation for some queries for frequency, which is described as an example in section IV. As a result, we can apply a differentially private mechanism correctly without any computational errors.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we present our experiment results. We show that our model has high efficiency and has resilient to collusion attacks by adversarial nodes in differentially private settings. We evaluate our error-based aggregation rules with both multi-Krum [16] and LearningChain [12] on the same privacy levels. The experiment results show that our model has a low error rate for the learning process and low transaction latency 3 in the network.
A. ENVIRONMENT SETTINGS

Datasets:
We conduct experiments on two datasets: the Wisconsin breast cancer dataset [42] with a binary class label and MNIST dataset [43] with a multinomial class label from 0 to 9 digits. The dataset for Wisconsin breast cancer has 569 instances with 30 dimensions. We randomly choose a total of 420 instances as a training dataset and the rest as a testing dataset equally with LearningChain. In MNIST, the dataset has 60000 instances as a training dataset and 10000 instances as a testing dataset with 28 × 28 dimensions.
1) DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE LOGISTIC REGRESSION
We implement differentially private SGD with a sigmoid function in a logistic regression algorithm for DML for the Wisconsin breast cancer dataset. In the error-based aggregation rule, the number of participants we set up are 10 parties with one endorsing peer. Therefore, the 10 participants have 45 instances each in both multi-Krum and Learning Chain. In our error-based process, the 10 participants have 10 instances each and one endorsing peer has 350 instances for a fair testing setting.
2) DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE MULTINOMIAL CLASSIFICATION
We implement differentially private SGD with cross-entropy in a two-layer-deep neural network algorithm for DML for the MNIST dataset. The number of participants we set up in this situation are 20 parties with three endorsing peers. Each party has 3000 instances in both multi-Krum and Learn-ingChain. In our error-based aggregation rule, however, each participant has 2700 instances and each endorsing peer has 2000 instances.
3) COMMON ENVIRONMENT SETTINGS
As described in section IV, we assume the number of f malicious attackers who can try to deteriorate the accuracy of the DML algorithms, with the total number of K participants, by assuming 2f + 2 < K . In our experiment, we set f = 0.3K attackers as malicious, and l as 0.6K . Also, we show the experiment results on a total 4, 10 −5 −differentially private level and 2, 10 −5 −differentially private level using a composition theorem [21] , [29] , [31] .
B. DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIMENT RESULTS
1) IMPLEMENTATION SETTINGS
With Python, we implement three aggregation rules, our error-based aggregation rule, the l−nearest aggregation rule in LeaningChain, and multi-Krum on differentially private settings in a distributed manner. We implement on Ubuntu 18.04 with i7-8700K and 16 GB RAM. On a hyperparameter side on machine learning, we set learning rate η as 0.1 and clipping size C as 0.2 for the Wisconsin breast cancer dataset and 4 for the MNIST data set, which is computed empirically in a non-private scenario. Additionally, for our aggregation rule, we set α = 2 to prevent a gradient scale that is too large.
In this situation, we consider two attack scenarios with a malicious local gradient. First, we apply it so that each of f attackers propose a local gradient drawn from a Gaussian distribution with mean zero, and isotropic covariance matrix with standard deviation 200. We refer to this as Gaussian attack [16] .
Second, we apply collusion attacks so that all f attackers propose the same local gradient drawn near correct gradient ∇ L f 1 , which is computed by cosine similarity, to deteriorate the accuracy of the DML model. In this scenario, only one attacker, f 1 , computes malicious gradient ∇L f 1 near his or her correct computed local gradient. Then, f 1 sends this malicious gradient to all other f −1 attackers. We refer to this as Low distance attack. In Low distance attacks, we evaluate with three different cosine similarity values, around 0.75, 0.63 and 0.48. This means each value has π 4, π 3.5, and π 3 distances from the original ∇ L f 1 if there is the same gradient scale.
2) DESCRIPTION OF AGGREGATION RULES
All experiments in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 represent the test error rate for LearningChain, multi-Krum, our error-based aggregation rule and baseline. In these figures, our model and LearningChain indicates our error-based aggregation and l−nearest result in each model, respectively. Baseline means that only DP is guaranteed, but it does not have any attack scenarios according to the aggregation rule. Also, we develop multi-Krum as a private version with DP. Now, we describe the aggregation processes to understand our experiment results. Previous aggregation rules mostly took a majority-based approach, which is looking at every subset of K − f local gradients, and considering the subset with the smallest diameter [16] . The majority-based approach has very high robustness for selecting and aggregating correct vectors. However, there are two issues, described as follows.
First, the majority-based aggregation rule has high computational complexity. In multi-Krum, they compute distances ||∇L i − ∇L j || 2 between each worker i and for all workers
where d is the dimension of each gradient. To reduce this huge computational complexity, in LearningChain, they compute distances ∇L ·∇L i /||∇L||·||∇L i || by cosine similarity that has O(K ·d) complexity where ∇L is the total global gradient for all workers including malicious attackers. However, they have lower robustness than multi-Krum, which means that it is influenced very much by adversarial nodes. We show how these results occur in some experimental settings described in the next subsection.
Second, we discover that the majority-based approach has weaknesses for adding noise in differentially private scenarios. Fig. 7 illustrates an aggregation process in a differentially private scenario with six participants, two adversarial nodes with l =3. First, all vectors are modified with noise from (a) by differentially private SGD. As a result, vectors are scattered in many different ways within a specific boundary that is computed by DP level, as illustrated in (b). The original majority-based approach mostly aggregates the number of l local gradients by their density metric function, as illustrated in (c).
On the contrary, we propose an error-based approach that uses our error-based systems for better accuracy and efficiency. Our metric in this process needs only simulation result and median computation. Therefore, only O(K · logK ) for median computation is needed when we compute a global gradient from the point where local gradient is submitted. Also, unlike the majority-based approach, the error-based approach has high accuracy because it is based on an error rate from endorsing peers. In many situations, some local gradient is selected and aggregated even though it has low scores for any density metric function, which is described in (d) in Fig. 7 . Additionally, we discover that the error-based approach has high accuracy than any other majority-based approach, even though each local gradient has larger noise. Fig. 5 shows the test error results for the test dataset of the Wisconsin breast cancer dataset with different DP levels, ε = 4 and ε = 2 with the same δ = 10 −5 under a Gaussian mechanism. All experiments except baseline are run with As a result, we show that our error-based process has enough resilience to two attacks.
C. EXPERIMENT RESULT DETAILS 1) ERROR RATE RESULTS FOR OUR AGGREGATION RULE
Also, Fig. 6 shows the error results for the test dataset of the MNIST dataset. The plots in this figure have the same formation as in Fig. 5 . In particular, in the Gaussian attack scenario, LearningChain cannot be converged because a malicious local gradient that has a large scale has to be inserted into the global gradient when it does learning in the early phase.
2) INFLUENCE BY COMPOSITION FOR PRIVACY BUDGET
Our experiment results show how these composition techniques affect utility. As described in section II, we have to use a composition theorem [21] , [31] to improve more utility on the same privacy level. Above this, the moments accountant method [22] has a lower bound than any other composition in a differentially private SGD.
However, we would not use moments accountant for the Wisconsin breast cancer dataset because we cannot set a sampling probability q < 1/16σ for σ ≥ 1 by Theorem 1) under total small instances size |D| = 450 for DML settings with multiple participants. Therefore, a relatively large noise is added for the Wisconsin breast cancer dataset. We add σ = 200 for 4, 10 −5 −DP and σ = 316 for 2, 10 −5 −DP with a Gaussian mechanism using strong composition [31] under 400 epochs.
In this situation, our experiment indicates that the majoritybased aggregation rules have a very high error rate that is same as the baseline in Fig. 5 . However, experiment results show that our error-based approach has high resilience in the same settings even if large noise is added to guarantee a relatively high privacy level. This means that our proposed model has high utility even if datasets have small instances.
On the other hand, for the MNIST dataset, we can adopt the moments accountant method because there are many instances for training datasets. For the same privacy level as described above, we can add small noise σ with small q < 1 16σ . With the moments accountant method, we can train until a specific number of epochs under each of the same parameter settings for privacy, which means that the number of training rounds has upper bound T max in the differentially private SGD with moments accountant until a privacy threat.
In our experiments, we test on σ = 4, T max = 55590 for total (4, 10 −5 ) and σ = 6, T max = 31269 for total (2, 10 −5 ) with q = 0.01, respectively.In this situation, as shown in Fig. 6 , our experiment indicates some results in two respects. First, we have to consider a rigorous differentially private algorithm that is more tightly bound for both accuracy of learning results and privacy protection.
Second, our error-based aggregation process still has a lower error rate than any other majority-based approach in both Gaussian attack and Low distance attack with four different scenarios. In a Gaussian attack, our error-based approach has a faster convergence ratio than other schemes, including baseline. Additionally, the majority-based approaches are influenced by Low distance attacks at almost 10% accuracy, which means that this attack is sometimes very harmful for majority-based approaches. Also, the results in (e) and (h) in Fig. 6 for Low distance attack with 0.48 as distances by cosine similarity show that multi-Krum has a more accurate density metric than LearningChain. This means that none of these previous aggregation processes have both computational complexity and learning accuracy without our errorbased approach.
3) TIME CONSUMPTION RESULTS FOR OUR MODEL
In particular, our model has not only DML accuracy, but also system efficiency in several respects. Fig. 8 illustrates the computation time for three aggregation rules. Also, in Fig. 9 , we compare transaction latency for two DML models, our proposed model and LearningChain. We skip multi-Krum because it does not provide any DML models except for adversarial scenarios in the aggregation process. We test with PoW [22] for LearningChain and PoET [25], [44] for our model, and record the results for an average of 10 times.
As shown in Fig. 8 , our error-based aggregation rule has lower time consumption than multi-Krum and LearningChain for several different participants in a large-scale distributed network. In particular, multi-Krum cannot be used in the distributed network because it has very high computation time when the scale of participants is large. Also, Fig. 9 . shows that our model has fairly low transaction latency compared to permissionless blockchain-based LearningChain if we adopt PoET [44] in our model for 20 participants. As a result, our model has 16 times more computation time savings than previous blockchain-based DML systems if we train until 500 rounds. The savings are huge even though we usually treat very large-scale datasets.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we developed a privacy-preserving DML on a permissioned blockchain with DP. In particular, we proposed a new DML model based on the simulate-order-execute architecture of Hyperledger Fabric [2] , which is one of the most popular, practical, and usable permissioned blockchain systems. As the main primitive, we proposed a new aggregation method based on errors to compute global weights, called an error-based aggregation rule. Our experiments show that our error-based aggregation rule has higher utility other majority-based aggregation rules in two scenarios of adversarial attacks on the aggregation process in the DML model. In particular our error-based aggregation rule has high utility in a differentially private scenario. Our model has lower time complexity than other aggregation rules and larger time savings than permissionless blockchain-based DML systems.
In future work it will be interesting to implement and modularize the proposed model, which can be controlled by chaincode functions. Also, it will be another future work to apply the modularized model to the latest Hyperledger Fabric open-source [20] in effect, which is able to be readily used under private data by channels and the DML network in Hyperledger Fabric.
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